On Optimal Linear Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of
  Heterogeneous Objects by Gujar, Sujit & Narahari, Yadati
ar
X
iv
:0
81
2.
47
92
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
8 D
ec
 20
08
On Optimal Linear Redistribution of VCG Payments in
Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
Sujit Gujar and Y Narahari
Dept of Computer Science and Automation
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,560012.
{sujit,hari}@csa.iisc.ernet.in
Abstract. There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p)
each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem
satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and minimizing the budget imbalance.
This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. Our main result is an impossibility the-
orem which rules out linear rebate functions with non-zero efficiency in heterogeneous object
assignment. Motivated by this theorem, we explore two approaches to get around this impos-
sibility. In the first approach, we show that linear rebate functions with non-zero are possible
when the valuations for the objects are correlated. In the second approach, we show that rebate
functions with non-zero efficiency are possible if linearity is relaxed.
Keywords: Groves Mechanism, Budget imbalance, Redistribution mechanism, Moulin mecha-
nism, Rebate function
1 Introduction
Consider that p public resources are available and n > p agents are interested in utilizing one of them.
Naturally. we should assign these resource such that those who value them most get it. Since Groves
mechanisms [13,3,6] have attractive game theoretic properties such as dominant strategy incentive
compatibility (DSIC) and allocative efficiency (AE), Groves mechanisms are widely used in practice.
However, in general, a Groves mechanism need not be budget balanced. That is, the total transfer
of money in the system may not be zero. So the system will be left with a surplus or deficit. Using
Clarke’s mechanism [3], we can ensure under fairly weak conditions that there is no deficit of money,
that is the mechanism is weakly budget balanced. In such a case, the system or the auctioneer will be
left with some money.
Often, the surplus money is not really needed in many social settings such as allocations by the
Government among its departments, etc. Since strict budget balance cannot coexist with DSIC and
AE (Green-Laffont theorem [5]), we would like to redistribute the surplus to the participants as far
as possible, preserving DSIC and AE. This idea was originally proposed by Laffont [11]. The total
payment made by the mechanism as a redistribution will be referred to as the rebate to the agents.
In this paper, we consider the following problem. There are n agents and p heterogeneous objects
(n ≥ p > 1). Each agent desires exactly one object out of these p objects. His valuation for any of the
objects is independent of his valuations for the other objects. Valuations of the different agents are
also mutually independent. Our goal is to design a mechanism for assignment of the p objects among
the n agents which is allocatively efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and maximizes
the rebate (which is equivalent to minimizing the budget imbalance). In addition, we would like the
mechanism to satisfy feasibility and individual rationality. Thus, we seek to design a Groves mechanism
for assigning p heterogeneous objects among n agents satisfying:
1. Feasibility (F) or weak budget balance. That is, the total payment to the agents should be less
than or equal to the total received payment.
2. Individual Rationality (IR), which means that each agent’s utility by participating in the mecha-
nism
should be non-negative.
3. Minimizes budget imbalance.
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We call such a mechanism Groves redistribution mechanism or simply redistribution mechanism.
Designing a redistribution mechanism involves design of an appropriate rebate function. If in a redis-
tribution mechanism, the rebate function for each agent is a linear function of the valuations of the
remaining agents, we refer to such mechanism as a linear redistribution mechanism, (LRM). In many
situations, design of an appropriate LRM turns out to be a problem of solving a linear program.
Due to the Green-Laffont theorem [5], we cannot guarantee 100% redistribution at all type profiles.
So a performance index for the redistribution mechanism would be the worst case redistribution. That
is, the fraction of the surplus which is guaranteed to be redistributed irrespective of the bid profiles.
This fraction will be referred to as efficiency in the rest of the paper (Note: This efficiency is not to be
confused with allocative efficiency). The advantage of worst case analysis is that, it does not require
any distributional information on the type sets of the agents. It is desirable that the rebate function
is deterministic and anonymous. A rebate function is said to be anonymous if two agents having the
same bids get the same rebate. So, the aim is to design an anonymous, deterministic rebate function
which maximizes the efficiency and satisfies feasibility and individual rationality.
Our paper seeks to extend the results of Moulin [12] and Guo and Conitzer [8] who have indepen-
dently designed a Groves mechanism in order to redistribute the surplus when objects are identical
(homogeneous objects case). Their mechanism is deterministic, anonymous, and has maximum effi-
ciency over all possible Groves redistribution mechanisms. We will refer to their mechanism as the
worst case optimal (WCO) mechanism orMoulin mechanism. WCO/Moulin Mechanisms are linear re-
distribution mechanisms. In this paper, we concentrate on designing a linear redistribution mechanism
for the heterogeneous objects case.
1.1 Relevant Work
As it is impossible to achieve allocative efficiency, DSIC, and budget balance simultaneously, we have
to compromise on either of these properties. Faltings [4] and Guo and Conitzer [9] achieve budget
balance by compromising on AE. If we are interested in preserving AE and DSIC, we have to settle
for a non-zero surplus or a non-zero deficit of the money (budget imbalance) in the system. To reduce
budget imbalance, various rebate functions have been designed by Bailey [1], Cavallo [2], Moulin [12],
and Guo and Conitzer [8]. Moulin [12] and Guo and Conitzer [8] designed a Groves redistribution
mechanism for assignments of p homogeneous objects among n > p agents with unit demand. Guo
and Conitzer [10] designed a redistribution mechanism which is optimal in the expected sense for the
homogeneous objects setting. Thus, it will require some distributional information over the type sets
of the agents. Sujit and Narahari [7] have designed a redistribution mechanism for the assignments of
p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents with unit demands. The rebate function proposed
by them is not a linear function.
1.2 Contributions and Outline
In this paper, we investigate the question of existence of a linear rebate function for redistribution of
surplus in assignment of heterogeneous objects. Our result shows that in general, when the domain
of valuations for each agent is Rp+, it is impossible to design a linear rebate function, with non-zero
efficiency, for the heterogeneous settings. However, we can relax the assumption of independence of
valuations of different objects to get a linear rebate function with non-zero efficiency. Another way
to get around the impossibility theorem is to relax the linearity requirement of a rebate function. In
particular, our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows.
– We first prove the impossibility of existence of a linear rebate function with non-zero efficiency for
the heterogeneous settings when the domain of valuations for each agent is Rp+ and the valuations
for the objects are independent.
– When the objects are heterogeneous but the values for the objects of an agent can be derived
from one single number, that is, the private information is still single dimensional, we design a
Groves redistribution mechanism which is linear, anonymous, deterministic, feasible, individually
rational, and efficient. In addition, the mechanism is worst case optimal.
– We show the existence of a non-linear rebate function that has non-zero efficiency.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notation followed in the paper and
describe some background work from the literature. In Section 3, we state and prove the impossibility
result. We derive an extension of Moulin/ WCO mechanism for heterogeneous objects but with single
dimensional private information in Section 4. The impossibility result does not rule out possibility
of non-linear rebate functions with strictly positive efficiency. We show this with a redistribution
mechanism, BAILEY, which is Bailey’s mechanism [1] applied to the settings under consideration in
Section 5. We will conclude the paper in Section 6.
We need an ordering of the bids of the agents which we define in Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
Table 1. Notation
n Number of agents
N Set of the agents = {1, 2, . . . , n}
p Number of objects
i Index for an agent, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
j Index for object, j = 1, 2, . . . , p
R+ Set of positive real numbers
θij Valuation of an agent i for an object j
θi A vector of valuations of the agent i, = (θi1, θi2, . . . , θip)
Θi The space of valuations of agent i,= R
p
+
Θ Θ1 ×Θ2 . . .×Θn
bi Bid submitted by agent i, = (bi1, bi2, . . . , bip) ∈ Θi
b (b1, b2, . . . , bn), the bid vector
K The set of all allocations of p objects to n agents, each getting at most one object
k(b) An allocation, k(. ) ∈ K, corresponding to the bid profile b
k∗(b) An allocatively efficient allocation when the bid profile is b
k∗−i(b) An allocatively efficient allocation when the bid profile is b and agent i is
excluded from the system
vi(k(b)) Valuation of the allocation k to the agent i, when b is the bid profile
v v : K → R, the valuation function, v(k(b)) =
P
i∈N vi(k(b))
ti(b) Payment made by agent i in the Clarke’s pivotal mechanism, when the bid profile is b
ti(b) = vi(k
∗(b))−
`
v(k∗(b))− v(k∗−i(b))
´
t(b) The Clarke payment, that is, the total
payment received from all the agents,
t(b) =
P
i∈N ti
t−i The Clarke payment received in the absence of the agent i
ri(b) Rebate to agent i when bid profile is b
e The efficiency of the mechanism, = infθ:t 6=0
P
ri(θ)
t(θ)
The notation used is summarized in Table 1. Note that, where the context is clear, we will use
t, ti, ri, k, and vi to indicate t(b), ti(b), ri(b), k(b), and vi(k(b)) respectively. In this paper, we assume
that the payment made by agent i is of the form ti(·) − ri(·), where ti(·) is agent i’s payment in the
Clarke’s pivotal mechanism [3]. We refer to
∑
i ti, as the total Clarke’s payment or the surplus in the
system.
2.1 Optimal Worst Case Redistribution when Objects are Identical
When the objects are identical, every agent i has the same value for each object, call it vi. Without
loss of generality, we will assume, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. In Clarke’s pivotal mechanism, the first p agents
will receive the objects and each of these p agents will pay vp+1. So, the surplus in the system is pvp+1.
For this situation, Moulin [12] and Guo and Conitzer [8] have independently designed a redistribution
mechanism.
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Guo and Conitzer [8] maximize the worst case fraction of total surplus which gets redistributed.
This mechanism is called the WCO mechanism. Moulin [12] minimizes the ratio of budget imbalance
to the value of an optimal allocation, that is the value of an allocatively efficient allocation. The WCO
mechanism coincides with Moulin’s feasible and individually rational mechanism. Both the above
mechanisms work as follows. After receiving bids from the agents, bids are sorted in decreasing order.
The first p agents receive the objects. Each agent’s Clarke’s payment is calculated, say ti. Every agent
i pays, pi = ti − ri, where, ri is the rebate function for an agent i. Suppose y1 ≥ y2 ≥ . . . ≥ yn−1 are
the bids of the (n− 1) agents excluding the agent i, then the rebate to the agent i is given by,
rWCOi =
n−1∑
j=p+1
cjyj (1)
where,
cj =
(−1)j+p−1 (n− p)
(
n− 1
p− 1
)
j
(
n− 1
j
)∑n−1
k=p
(
n− 1
k
)


n−1∑
k=j
(
n− 1
k
)
 (2)
for i = p+ 1, . . . , n− 1.
The efficiency of this mechanism is e∗, where e∗ is given by,
e∗ = 1−
(
n− 1
p
)
∑n−1
k=p
(
n− 1
k
)
This has been shown to be optimal in sense that no other mechanism can guarantee greater than e∗
fraction redistribution in the worst case.
3 Impossibility of Linear Rebate Function with Non-Zero
Efficiency
We have just reviewed the design of a redistribution mechanism for homogeneous objects. We have
seen that the Moulin/WCO mechanism is a linear function of the types of agents. We now explore the
general case. In the homogeneous case, the bids are real numbers which can be arranged in decreasing
order. The Clarke’s surplus is a linear function of these ordered bids. For the heterogeneous scenario,
this would not be the case. Each bid bi belongs to R
p
+; hence, there is no unique way of defining an
order among the bids. Moreover, the Clarke’s surplus is not a linear function of received bids in the
heterogeneous case. So, we cannot expect any linear/affine rebate function of types to work well at all
type profiles. We will prove this formally.
We first generalize a theorem due to Guo and Conitzer [8]. The context in which Guo and Conitzer
[8] stated and proved the theorem is in the homogeneous setting. We now show that this result holds
true in the heterogeneous objects case also. The symbol < denotes the order over the bids of the
agents, as defined in the Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1. Any deterministic, anonymous rebate function f is DSIC iff,
ri = f(v1, v2, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn) ∀ i ∈ N (3)
where, v1 < v2 < . . . < vn.
Proof: We provide only a sketch of the proof.
– The “if” part: If ri takes the form given by equation (3), then the rebate of agent i is independent
of his valuation. The allocation rule satisfies allocative efficiency. So, the mechanism is still Groves
and hence DSIC. The rebate function defined is deterministic. If two agents have the same bids,
then, as per the ordering defined in Appendix, <, they will have the same ranking. Suppose agents i
and i+1 have the same bids. Thus vi < vi+1 and vi+1 < vi. So, ri = f(v1, v2, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn)
and ri+1 =
f(v1, v2, . . . , vi, vi+2, . . . , vn). Since vi = vi+1, ri = ri+1. Thus the rebate function is anonymous.
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– The “only if” part: The homogeneous objects case is a special case of the mechanism. When
objects are homogeneous, the ordering of the bids < matches the ≥ ordering on real numbers.
If the rebate function is not in the form defined in the theorem, the rebate function would not
simultaneously satisfy the DSIC, anonymity, and deterministic properties. This is because the
above form of the rebate function is a necessary condition when the objects are identical. Thus
we need a rebate function in this form in heterogeneous settings as well.

We now state and prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2. If a redistribution mechanism is feasible and individually rational, then there cannot
exist a linear rebate function which satisfies all the following properties:
– DSIC
– deterministic
– anonymous
– non-zero efficiency.
Proof : Assume that there exists a linear function, say f , which satisfies the above properties. Let
v1 < v2 < . . . < vn. Then according to Theorem 1, for each agent i,
ri = f(v1, v2, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn)
= (c0, ep) + (c1, v1) + . . .+ (cn−1, vn)
where, ci = (ci1, ci2, . . . , cip) ∈ R
p, ep = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ R
p, and (·, ·) denotes the inner product of two
vectors in Rp. Now, we will show that the worst case performance of f will be zero. To this end, we
will study the structure of f , step by step.
Observation 1: Consider type profile (v1, v2, . . . , vn) where v1 = v2 = . . . = vn = (0, 0, . . . , 0). For this
type profile, the total Clarke’s surplus is zero and ri = (c0, ep) ∀ i ∈ N . Individual rationality implies,
(c0, ep) ≥ 0 (4)
Feasibility should imply the total redistributed amount is less than the surplus, that is,
∑
i
ri = n(c0, ep) 6 0 (5)
From, (4) and (5), it is easy to see that, (c0, ep) = 0.
Observation 2: Consider type profile (v1, v2, . . . , vn) where v1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) and v2 = . . . , vn =
(0, 0, . . . , 0). For this type profile, r1 = 0 and if i 6= 1, ri = c11 ≥ 0 for individual rationality. For this
type profile, the Clarke’s surplus is zero. Thus, for feasibility,
∑
i ri = (n−1)c11 ≤ t = 0. This implies,
c11 = 0.
In the above profile, by considering v1 = (0, 1, , 0, . . . , 0), we get c12 = 0. Similarly, one can show
c13 = c14 = . . . = c1p = 0.
Observation 3: Continuing like above with, v1 = v2 = . . . = vi = ep, and vi+1 = (1, 0 . . . , 0) or
(0, 1, 0 . . . , 0), . . . or (0, . . . , 0, 1), we get, ci+1 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) ∀ i ≤ p− 1. Thus,
ri =


(cp+1, vp+2) + . . .+ (cn−1, vn) : if i ≤ p+ 1
(cp+1, vp+1) + . . .+ (ci−1, vi−1)
+(ci, vi+1) + . . .+ (cn−1, vn) : otherwise
We now claim that efficiency of this mechanism is zero. That is, in the worst case, the fraction of
the Clarke’s surplus that gets redistributed is zero. Suppose we show that there exists a type profile,
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for which the Clarke’s surplus non-zero and the rebate to each agent is zero. Then the theorem is
proved. So, it remains to show the existence of such a type profile. Consider the type profile:
v1 = (2p− 1, 2p− 2, . . . , p)
v2 = (2p− 2, 2p− 3, . . . , p− 1)
...
vp = (p, p− 1, . . . , 1)
and vp+1 = vp+2 . . . = vn = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
Now, with this type profile, agent 1 pays (p − 1), agent 2 pays (p − 2), . . . , agent (p − 1) pays 1
and the remaining agents pay 0. Thus, the Clarke’s payment received is non-zero but it can be seen
that ri = 0 for all agents.

The above theorem provides a disappointing news. It rules out the possibility of a linear redistri-
bution mechanism for heterogeneous settings which will have non-zero efficiency. However, there are
two ways to get around it.
1. The domain of types under which Theorem 2 holds is, Θi = R
p
+, ∀ i ∈ N . One idea is to restrict
the domain of types. In Section 3, we design a worst case optimal linear redistribution mechanism
when the valuations of agents for the heterogeneous objects have a certain type of correlation.
2. Explore the existence of a rebate function which is not a linear and yields a non-zero performance.
We explore this in Section 5.
4 A Redistribution Mechanism for Heterogeneous Objects having Scaling
Based Correlation
Consider a scenario where the objects are not identical but the valuations for the objects are cor-
related and can be derived by a single parameter. As a motivating example, consider the website
somefreeads.com and assume that there are p slots available for advertisements and there are n
agents interested in displaying their ads. Naturally, every agent will have a higher preference for a
higher slot. Define click through rate of a slot as the number of times the ad is clicked, when the ad is
displayed in that slot, divided by the number of impressions. Let the click through rates for slots be
α1 ≥ α2 ≥ α3 . . . ≥ αp. Assume that each agent has the same value for each click by the user, say vi.
So, the agent’s value for the jth slot will be αjvi. Let us use the phrase valuations with scaling based
correlation to describe such valuations. We define this more formally below.
Definition 1. We say the valuations of the agents have scaling based correlation if there exist positive
real numbers α1, α2, α3, . . . , αp > 0 such that, for each agent i ∈ N , the valuation for object j is of
the form θij = αjvi, where vi ∈ R+ is a private signal observed by agent i.
Without loss of generality, we assume, α1 ≥ α2 ≥ α3 . . . ≥ αp > 0.
For the above setting, we design a Groves mechanism which is almost budget balanced and optimal
in the worst case. Our mechanism is similar to that of Guo and Conitzer [8] and our proof uses the
same line of arguments.
The following theorem by Guo and Conitzer [8] will be used to design our mechanism.
Theorem 3. For any x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . xn ≥ 0,
a1x1 + a2x2 + . . . anxn ≥ 0 iff
j∑
i=1
ai ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, 2 . . . , n
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4.1 The Proposed Mechanism
We will use a linear rebate function. (For making equations symmetric, we will assume that there are
(n− p) virtual objects, with αp+1 = αp+2 = . . . = αn = 0). We propose the following mechanism:
– The agents submit their bids.
– Their bids are sorted in decreasing order.
– The highest bidder will be allotted the first object, the second highest bidder will be allotted the
second object, and so on.
– Agent i will pay ti − ri, where ti is the Clarke’s payment and ri is the rebate.
ti =
p∑
j=i
(αj − αj+1)vj+1
– Let agent i’s rebate be,
ri = c0 + c1v1 + . . .+ ci−1vi−1 + civi+1 + . . .+ cn−1vn
The mechanism is required to be individually rational and feasible.
– The mechanism will be individually rational iff ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N . That is, ∀ i ∈ N ,
c0 + c1v1 + . . .+ ci−1vi−1 + civi+1 + . . .+ cn−1vn ≥ 0.
– The mechanism will be feasible if the total redistributed payment is less than or equal to the
surplus. That is,
∑
i ri ≤ t =
∑
i ti or t−
∑
i ri ≥ 0, where,
t =
p∑
j=1
j(αj − αj+1)vj+1.
With the above setup, we now derive c0, c1, . . . , cn−1 that will maximize the fraction of surplus which
is redistributed among the agents.
Step 1: First, we claim that, c0 = c1 = 0. This can be proved as follows. Consider the type profile,
v1 = v2 = . . . = vn = 0. For this type profile, individual rationality implies ri = c0 ≥ 0 and t = 0. So
for feasibility,
∑
i ri = nc0 ≤ t = 0. That is, c0 should be zero. Similarly, by considering type profile
v1 = 1, v2 = . . . = vn = 0, we get c1 = 0.

Step 2: Using c0 = c1 = 0,
– The feasibility condition can be written as:
n−1∑
j=2
(
(j − 1)(αj−1 − αj)− (j − 1)cj−1 − (n− j)cj
)
vj − (n− 1)cn−1vn ≥ 0 (6)
– The individual rationality condition can be written as
c2v2 + . . .+ ci−1vi−1 + civi+1 + . . .+ cn−1vn ≥ 0 (7)
Step 3: When we say our mechanism’s efficiency is e, we mean,
∑
i ri ≥ et, that is,
n−1∑
j=2
(
− e(j − 1)(αj−1 − αj) + (j − 1)cj−1 + (n− j)cj
)
vj + (n− 1)cn−1vn ≥ 0 (8)
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Step 4: Define β1 = α1 −α2, and for i = 2, . . . , p, let βi = i(αi − αi+1) + βi−1. Now, inequalities (6),
(7), and (8) have to be satisfied for all values of v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Invoking Theorem (3), we need
to satisfy the following set of inequalities:
∑j
i=2 ci ≥ 0 ∀j = 2, . . . n− 1
eβ1 ≤ (n− 2)c2 ≤ β1
eβi−1 ≤ n
∑i−1
j=2 cj + (n− i)ci ≤ βi−1 i = 3, . . . , p
eβp ≤ n
∑i−1
j=2 cj + (n− i)ci ≤ βp i = p+ 1, . . . , n− 1
eβp ≤ n
∑n−1
j=2 cj ≤ βp
Now, the social planner wishes to design a mechanism that maximizes e subject to the above con-
straints.
Define xj =
∑j
i=2 ci for j = 2, . . . , n−1. This is equivalent to solving the following linear program.
maximize e
s.t.
eβ1 ≤ (n− 2)x2 ≤ β1
eβi−1 ≤ ixi−1 + (n− i)xi ≤ βi−1 i = 3, . . . , p
eβp ≤ ixi−1 + (n− i)xi ≤ βp i = p+ 1, . . . , n− 1
eβp ≤ nxn−1 ≤ βp
xi ≥ 0 ∀i = 2, . . . , n− 1
(9)
So, given n and p, the social planner will have to solve the above optimization problem and determine
the optimal values of e, c2, c3, . . . , cn−1.
The discussion above can be summarized as the following theorem.
Theorem 4. When the valuations of the agents have scaling based correlation, for any p and n > p+1,
the linear redistribution mechanism obtained by solving LP (9) is worst case optimal among all Groves
redistribution mechanisms that are feasible, individually rational, deterministic, and anonymous.
Proof: This can be proved following the line of arguments of Guo and Conitzer [8].

5 Non-linear Redistribution Mechanisms for the Heterogeneous Setting
We should note that the homogeneous objects case is a special case of the heterogeneous objects case
in which each bidder submits the same bid for all objects. Thus, we cannot expect any redistribution
mechanism to perform better than the homogeneous objects case. For n ≤ p + 1, the worst case
redistribution is zero for the homogeneous case and so will be for the heterogeneous case. So, we assume
n > p+ 1. We propose a redistribution mechanism which we will refer to as BAILEY mechanism. It
is to be noted that the BAILEY redistribution scheme the mechanism proposed by Bailey [1] applied
to the heterogeneous setting.
5.1 BAILEY Mechanism
First, consider the case when p = 1. Let the valuations of the agents for the object be, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥
vn. The agent with the highest valuation will receive the object and would pay the second highest
bid. Cavallo [2] proposed the rebate function as,
r1 = r2 =
1
n
v3
ri =
1
n
v2 i > 2
Motivated by this scheme, we propose a scheme for the heterogeneous setting. Suppose agent i is
excluded from the system. Then let t−i be the Clarke’s surplus in the system (defined in Table 1).
Define,
ri
B =
1
n
t−i ∀ i ∈ N (10)
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– As the Clarke surplus is always positive, ri
B ≥ 0 for all i. Thus, this scheme satisfies individual
rationality.
– t−i ≤ t ∀ i. So,
∑
i ri
B =
∑
i
1
n
t−i ≤ n 1
n
t = t. Thus, this scheme is feasible.
We now show that the BAILEY scheme has non-zero efficiency if n ≥ 2p + 1. First we prove
two lemmas. These lemma’s are useful in designing redistribution mechanisms for the heterogeneous
settings as well as in analysis of the mechanisms. Lemma 2 is used to show non-zero efficiency of the
BAILEY mechanism. Lemma 1 is used to find allocatively efficient outcome for the settings under
consideration. Also, this lemma 1 is useful in determining Clarke’s payments.
Lemma 1. If we sort the bids of all the agents for each object, then
1. An optimal allocation, that is an allocatively efficient allocation, will consist of the agents having
bids among the p highest bids for each object.
2. If any one of the agents from an optimal allocation is removed from the system, there exists an
optimal allocation in which the remaining (p− 1) agents receive the objects, perhaps not the same
objects as in the original optimal allocation.
Proof:
– Suppose an optimal allocation contains an agent whose bid for his winning object, say j, is not
in the top p bids for the jth object. There are other (p− 1) winners in an optimal allocation. So,
there exists at least one agent whose bid is in the top p bids for the jth object and does not win
any object. Thus, allocating him the jth object, we have an allocation which has higher valuation
than the declared optimal allocation.
– Suppose an agent i who receives an object in an optimal allocation is removed from the system.
The agent will have at most one bid in the top p bids for each object. So, agents now having bids
in the top p bids, will be at the pth position. It can be seen that there will be at most one agent in
an optimal allocation who is on the pth position for the object he wins. If there is more than one
agent in an optimal allocation on the pth position for the object they win, then we can improve
on this allocation. Hence, after removing i, there will be at most one more agent who will be a
part of a new optimal allocation.

Lemma 2. There are at most 2p agents involved in deciding the Clarke’s payment.
Proof: The argument is as follows:
1. Sort the bids of the agents for each object.
2. The optimal allocation consists of agents having bids in the p highest bids for each of the objects
(Lemma 1).
3. For computing the Clarke’s payment of the agent i, we remove the agent and determine an optimal
allocation. And, using his bid, the valuation of optimal allocation with him and without him will
determine his payment. This is done for each agent i. As per Lemma 1, if any agent from an optimal
allocation is removed from the system, there exists a new optimal allocation which consists of at
least (p− 1) agents who received the objects in the original optimal allocation.
4. There will be p agents receiving the objects and determining their payments will involve removing
one of them at a time, there will be at most p more agents who will influence the payment. Thus,
there are at most 2p agents involved in determining the Clarke’s payment.

Note: When the objects are identical, the bids of (p + 1) agents are involved in determining the
Clarke’s payment.
Now, we show non-zero efficiency of the BAILEY redistribution scheme.
Proposition 1. The BAILEY redistribution scheme has non-zero efficiency, if n ≥ 2p+ 1.
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Proof: In Lemma 2 (See Appendix), we have shown that there will be at most 2p agents involved in
determining the Clarke surplus. Thus, given a type profile, there will be (n − 2p) agents, for whom,
t−i = t and this implies that at least n−2p
n
t will be redistributed.

Note: The proof of Proposition 1 indicates that the efficiency of this mechanism is at least n−2p
n
.
Before we conclude, we would like to state an algorithmic implication of Lemma 11.
Algorithmic Implication of Lemma 1
To implement the Clarke’s mechanism, a naive approach will be to consider all possible feasible
allocations and find out an optimal allocation. There will be C = n(n − 1) . . . (n − p + 1) feasible
allocations. An optimal allocation will be found in O(C) time. For calculating payments for each agent
in an optimal allocation, we have to find an optimal allocation without that agent, which will amount
to O(p ∗ C′) time complexity, where C′ = (n − 1)(n − 2) . . . (n − p). So total time complexity will be
O(p ∗ C′ + C).
Now as per lemma 1, for finding an optimal allocation, we can concentrate only on the top p
bids for each object. This can be done in O(pn log n) time and now the number of allocations which
we have to consider, will be C′′ = p(p − 1) . . . (1) = p!. So we can determine the VCG payment in
O((p+1)C′′+ pn logn) time complexity. This will be much faster when n is very large compared to p.

6 Conclusion
We addressed the problem of assigning p heterogeneous objects among n > p competing agents. When
the valuations of the agents are independent of each other and their valuations for each object are
independent of valuations on the other objects, we proved the impossibility of the existence of a linear
redistribution mechanism with non-zero efficiency. Then we explored two approaches to get around
this impossibility. In the first approach, we showed that linear rebate functions with non-zero are
possible when the valuations for the objects have scaling based correlation. In the second approach,
we showed that rebate functions with non-zero efficiency are possible if linearity is relaxed.
It would be interesting to see if we can characterize the situations under which linear redistribution
mechanisms with non-zero efficiency are possible for heterogeneous settings. Another interesting prob-
lem to explore is to design redistribution mechanisms that are worst case optimal for heterogeneous
settings.
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A Ordering of the Agents Based on Bid Profiles
We will define a ranking among the agents. This ranking is used crucially in proving a Theorem 1 on
rebate function. This theorem is similar to Cavallo’s theorem on characterization of DSIC, determin-
istic, anonymous rebate functions for homogeneous objects. We would not be actually computing the
order among the bidders. We will use this order for proving impossibility of the linear rebate function
with the desired properties.
A.1 Properties of the Ranking System
When we are defining ranking/ordering among the agents, we expect the following properties to hold
true:
– Any permutation of the objects and the corresponding permutation on bid vector,
(bi1, bi2, . . . , bip) for each agent i, should not change the ranking. That is, the ranking should be
independent of the order in which the agents are expected to bid for this objects.
– Two bidders with the same bid vectors should have the same rank.
– By increasing the bid on any of the objects, the rank of an agent should not decrease.
A.2 Ranking among the Agents
This is a very crucial step. First, find out all feasible allocations of the p objects among the n agents,
each agent receiving at most one object. Sort these allocations, according to the valuation of an
allocation. Call this list L. To find the ranking between i and j, we uses the following algorithm.
1. Lij = L
2. Delete all the allocations from Lij which contain both i and j.
3. Find out the first allocation in Lij which contains one of the agent i or j. Say k
′.
(a) Suppose this allocation contains i and has value strictly greater than any of remaining alloca-
tions from Lij containing j, then we say, i ≻ j.
(b) Suppose this allocation contains j and has value strictly greater than any of remaining allo-
cations from Lij containing i, then we say, j ≻ i.
4. If the above step is not able to decide the ordering between i and j, let A = {k ∈ K|v(k) = v(k′)}.
Update Lij = Lij \ A and recur to step (2) till EITHER
• there is no allocation containing the agent i or j OR
• the ordering between i and j is decided.
5. If the above steps do not give either of i ≻ j or j ≻ i, we say, i ≡ j or i < j as well as j < i
Before we state some properties of this ranking system <, we will explain it with an example.
Let there be two items A and B, and four bidders. That is, p = 2, n = 4 and let their bids be:
b1 = (4, 5), b2 = (2, 1), b3 = (1, 4), and b4 = (1, 0).
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Now, allocation (A = 1, B = 3) has the highest valuation among all the allocations. So,
agent 1 ≻ agent 2
agent 1 ≻ agent 4
agent 3 ≻ agent 2
agent 3 ≻ agent 4
Now, in L13 defined in the procedure above, the allocation (A = 2, B = 1) has strictly higher value
than any other allocation in which the agent 3 is present. So,
agent 1 ≻ agent 3.
Thus,
agent 1 ≻ agent 3 ≻ agent 2 and
agent 1 ≻ agent 3 ≻ agent 4
In L24, the allocation (A = 2, B = 1) has strictly higher value than any other allocation in which the
agent 4 is present. Thus, the ranking of the agents is,
agent 1 ≻ agent 3 ≻ agent 2 ≻ agent 4
We can show that the ranking defined above, satisfies the following properties.
1. < defines a total order on set of bids.
2. < is independent of the order of the objects.
3. If two bids are the same, then they are equivalent in this order.
4. By increasing a bid, no agent will decrease his rank.
If agent i < agent j, we will also say vi < vj .
